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“To Assyst the Ordynaryes”: Why Thomas

More Agreed to Become Chancellor
Peter Iver Kaufman

University of Richmond
Richmond, VA, 23173
pkaufman@richmond.edu

Revisionists’ explanations for Thomas More’s willingness to serve as
Chancellor have him scheming to support the Aragonese faction at Court--or
conspiring with Hapsburg agents to revive papal influence in England in the
wake of Campeggio’s departure and Wolsey’s “fall.” In late 1529, More was
obviously concerned with lay disaffection, troubled by the prospect that
sectarian dissidents might capitalize on it to reform the church recklessly, and
confident that the realm’s bishops, assisted by the government, could
outmaneuver the critics of Roman and English Catholicism, whose arguments
for an alternative ecclesiology and soteriology he had opposed earlier that year.
“To Assyst” presents More’s concern and confidence as a more plausible
answer to the question in its title, more plausible than rival responses on offer.
Keywords: heresy, chancellor, More, reform, bishops.
Selon certains historiens, l’acceptation par Thomas More du poste de Chancelier fut une
maneuvre pour soutenir le clan aragonais à la cour – ou pour conspirer avec les agents des
Habsbourg qui souhaitaient raviver l’influence du pape en Angleterre à la suite du départ de
Campeggio et de la « chute » de Wolsey. Il apparaît clairement que More, à la fin de l’année
1529, était inquiet de la désaffection des laïques, et craignait que les dissidents les plus
sectaires en profitent pour réformer l’Eglise de façon radicale ; mais il croyait fermement que
les évêques du royaume, assisté du gouvernement, réussiraient à déjouer les critiques du
catholicisme romain et anglais ; il s’était opposé quelques mois plus tôt à leurs arguments en
faveur d’une ecclésiologie et d’une sotériologie alternatives. Cet article propose que, parmi les
diverses réponses possibles à la question posée en titre, à savoir pourquoi Thomas More
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accepta de devenir Chancelier d’Angleterre, la réponse la plus plausible est que, tout en étant
soucieux mais profondément confiant, il le fit « pour aider » (« To Assyst »).

Mots-clé : H érésie, chancelier, More, réformes, évêques
Según algunos historiadores, el hecho de que Moro aceptara el cargo de
Canciller formaba parte de una maniobra orquestada para apoyar la facción
aragonesa de la Corte o, lo que es lo mismo, conspirar con los Hausburgo
para reavivar la influencia papal en Inglaterra tras la marcha de Campeggio a la
« caída » de Wolsey. A finals de 1529, Moro estaba obviamente preocupado
por la insatisfacción de los laicos, inquietos ante la perspectiva de que los
sectores disidentes pudieran aprovecharse de esto para reformar la iglesia sin
miramientos. En otro sentido, Moro confiaba en que los obispos del reino,
asistidos por el gobierno, podrían superar las críticas del catolicismo romano e
inglés, cuyos razonamientos en favor de unas eclesiologías y soteriologias
alternativas él mismo había rechazado a principios de año. « Para
asisitir » presenta las preocupaciones y confianzas de Moro como respuesta
plausible –más que las respuestas «rivales »- a la pregunta en el título.
Palabras Clave: Herejía, Canciller, Moro, reforma, obispos.

***
When an essay’s principal question and its answer can be packed
together into a title, one ought to be promptly told why the pages that
follow had to be written. More’s motivation and expectations in 1529,
when he was appointed Lord Chancellor, after all, have often been
reconstructed--by glancing back at what he and his Hythloday had said
about public service in Utopia or by peering ahead and sifting what was
discussed after More’s resignation. The publication of G.W. Bernard’s
super-sized study of The King’s Reformation, which rejects the two most
common explanations before offering its own, too simple solution,
seems an excellent occasion to raise the issue again.
A number of More’s admirers have long claimed that he was
temperamentally disinclined to serve, though, composing the first book
of Utopia, he seemed prepared to answer a summons to Court. After all,
he met Hythloday’s criticism of courtiers--which, of course, he had
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scripted--with the concession that one must enter government service,
if only to control damage that self-serving, sycophantic colleagues
might otherwise do. But historians Geoffrey Elton and John Guy
reconstructed More’s temperament and ambition differently. They
inferred his sympathies from what a few onlookers reported during his
tenure, concluding that More agreed to serve the king but schemed to
assist the queen, Catherine of Aragon, and to support an Aragonese
faction at court opposed to Henry’s plans to marry Anne Boleyn. More
subsequently insisted that he struck a bargain with Henry whereby, as
chancellor, he would be permitted to keep his distance from the
deliberations about papal dispensations, scriptural prohibitions, and his
sovereign’s scruples. After he resigned, he protested that he never
meddled in the king’s “great matter” and mess. Still, Elton and Guy
argue, More’s “distance” and professed neutrality are unsupported by
the evidence, which tells them that he was intriguing with influential
others on Catherine’s behalf. But now G.W. Bernard’s new book
emphasizes Henry’s “driving role” in “the remaking of the English
church.” According to Bernard, More drove no bargain and had no
choice; he was chosen and summoned, and he obeyed. 1
Bargain? Faction? Ferocious royal determination? Bernard’s
emphasis on the third does recover the king’s tenacity, which other
historians’ stress on the second has all but eclipsed, but at what cost?
Was More little more than the king’s pawn? The point of this paper is
to retrieve something of the chancellor’s ingenuity and aspirations that
the arguments about his bargaining and scheming seem to have missed
or minimized. But before we investigate why he agreed to serve as
chancellor, we ought to recall how it happened.
Had his predecessor, Cardinal and papal legate Thomas Wolsey,
managed Henry’s case against Queen Catherine more expeditiously,
1

Bernard, The King’s Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English
Church, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, p. 130-35. For the bargaining and
scheming, see Geoffrey R. Elton, inter alia, “Sir Thomas More and the Opposition
to Henry VIII,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 41, 1968, p. 19-34
and John Guy, Thomas More, London: Arnold, 2000, p. 146-65.
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More’s turn as chancellor might have come much later. There probably
would have been no shakeup in the king’s “cabinet” in late 1529. To
be sure, Wolsey had tried. For much of that year, he warned the pope
that Rome was likely to “lose the king and the devotion of [the] realm,”
if the proceedings preliminary to Henry’s obtaining an annulment of his
first marriage were adjourned in England and “advoked,” unresolved,
to the papal curia. Wolsey’s agents echoed their retainer’s forecast and
added that Pope Clement VII would “sustayne” a terrible “unquietness
of mynd’ in the wake of England’s disaffection. Still, Clement could
not afford to give Wolsey and Henry what they most wanted. Perhaps
he was persuaded that “the king’s person and al his nobles shulde
decline from the pope and his see apostolique” once Rome refused to
acquiesce. 2 Yet Clement’s problem that summer was an “unquietness”
closer to home. Emperor Charles V was in Lombardy. The pope’s
friends in Florence thought him unstoppable, fortissimus. Hapsburg
troops in Italy were previously challenged by the French, yet the peace
negotiated at Cambrai left them free to range across the region. Hence,
Rome could not risk alienating Charles by dissolving the marriage
between his aunt Catherine and the king of England. 3 So Clement put
on a brave face. He feigned confidence, as late as July, that Wolsey
could weather the crisis, reconcile the king to additional delays, and
keep him conventionally and–for Rome–conveniently deferential. 4
Yet, if his confidence were unfeigned, Clement miscalculated,
underestimating the magnitude of Wolsey’s difficulties. True, his legate
was still chancellor, but he had powerful enemies at Court. Put off by
his swagger when England’s enduring friendship seemed to be dear to
Rome, they relished his vexation as the pope grew less fearful of the
French and more dependent on the Hapsburgs, all of which made
England less useful and left Wolsey exposed. Moreover, in January
1529, Henry had been heard blaming Wolsey for his long “ordeal,” his
long wait to be free of Catherine. Faction and friction at Court
probably contributed to Wolsey’s fall, as did the truces affecting papal
2
3
4

BL, Cotton MS. Vitellius B XI, 172r, 175v, 199v-200r.
BL, Cotton MS. Vitellius B XI, 181v (fortissimus), and 187v.
BL, Cotton MS. Vitellius BXI, 215r; LP 4.3, 5351.
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interests in Italy, although the chief factor was almost certainly Henry
VIII’s mounting impatience. 5
Thomas Cromwell was bent on succeeding where Wolsey had
failed--but by a different route. He left it to Wolsey’s strident enemy,
Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, to oppose the Aragonese party in
the House of Lords, while he concentrated on coupling the king’s
“great matter” with the anticlericalism often expressed in the Lower
House of Parliament. He stirred resentment against prelates committed
to the queen’s cause. Still, Henry, Cromwell, and Howard had quite a
challenge. Catherine enjoyed considerable support in the king’s
Council. Some bishops, moreover, were not easily bullied. John Fisher
of Rochester, who indefatigably presented the queen’s case before the
legatine commission, over which Cardinals Wolsey and Campeggio had
presided, continued to claim that a marriage pinned on a papal
dispensation--as Henry’s to Catherine was--should not be dissolved by
Parliament. To do so, he alleged, was overreaching and apostasy.
Bishop Tunstall of London (and later Durham) ably helped to
formulate the Aragonese arguments, as did Bishop West of Ely.
Bishop Standish of St. Asaph was steadfast in Parliament, yet he turned
rather tepid in Convocation, proposing that the papal dispensation
permitting Henry to wed his deceased brother’s wife was flawed. 6
Some say that Thomas More became chancellor and stayed in office
despite setbacks in Parliament engineered by Howard and Cromwell, to
fortify the somewhat unsteady Aragonese faction, because he believed
“the battle in the Privy Council could still be won.” John Guy, echoing
Geoffrey Elton, sums up: More “was not merely caught up in politics:
he was deeply implicated” in the Aragonese efforts to subvert or at least
stall Henry’s energetic efforts to set Catherine aside and marry Anne
Boleyn. He urged on the queen’s friends in Parliament. He encouraged
them in Council. Yet so agile was the revisionist’s More that his intrigue
5

CSP, Spain, 3.2, p. 877. Also consult Peter Gwyn’s account, The King’s Cardinal,
London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1990, especially p. 579-83.
6
John Guy, The Public Career of Sir Thomas More, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1980, p. 41-44.
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went undetected at the time and thereafter. 7 Did his public
pronouncements mislead Henry and Cromwell? Did he fool them by
pretending to be enthusiastic about the universities’ endorsements of
the king’s suit, which he read to Parliament, or by appearing to attest to
delegates the sincerity of Henry’s belief that he had violated God’s law
by marrying Catherine, or by conspiring with Howard to stifle
Aragonese efforts to discuss the king’s conscience in Parliament. On
the validity of the queen’s marriage to Prince Arthur, Henry’s deceased
elder brother and, by implication, the invalidity of her marriage to the
king, Thomas More pulled his oar. Odd tactics, if his long-term strategy
was to strengthen the Aragonese faction, see Catherine vindicated, and
call a halt to the Boleyn seduction.
Eustace Chapuys, imperial ambassador to England, reported that
More’s odd tactics were part of an elaborate ruse designed to throw off
suspicion that he was, in reality, a “great friend” of the queen’s friends.
Even More’s reluctance to receive the ambassador was part of the
deception. Privately and “boldly,” according to Chapuys, More
defended Aragonese and Hapsburg interests in the king’s presence.
Behind the chancellor’s elliptical expressions lay a profound desire to
gratify the emperor, assist Catherine, and undermine Cromwell--or so
Chapuys inferred. After all, More swiftly, favorably serviced every
request made by the ambassador and by the emperor’s other associates
in England. So much, then, for the chancellor’s caution! 8
That contradiction--More’s courtesies and caution--has been
disregarded by revisionists. On balance, they think that Chapuys’
accounts of the chancellor’s behind-the-scenes, Aragonese agitation are
quite trustworthy. Chapuys, whom they identify as “the center of the
intrigue,” would have known and told his superiors all about More’s
efforts at a hostile court, avec les loups. John Guy, however, has
reservations. Without slipping from the revisionists’ camp, he considers
that the ambassador’s dispatches are “not unimpeachable,” yet, Guy
7
8

Guy, Public Career, p. 158-59 and Guy, More, p. 156, 162.
LP 5, 60 and 5, 85.
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adds immediately, they are “suggestive.” 9 But what do they suggest? To
Guy, the ambassador left us a fairly reliable sketch of More, a publicly
evasive, though privately emphatic, “great friend” to the queen’s
friends. On this reading, Chapuys and More, who became Lord
Chancellor only a few weeks after the ambassador arrived from Savoy
in late summer, 1529, quickly made common cause. One can read the
dispatches differently, of course; the diplomat could have been
exaggerating his intimacy with and his influence on the chancellor to
demonstrate that the emperor had gotten an impressive return on his
investment?
Or do Chapuys’ statements suggest that More was playing him? His
candor is often and justly celebrated, yet his ingenuity is also legend.
And the latter, applied to early modern politics, sometimes dictated that
the former--honesty--might not be the best policy for all seasons.
Might More have set out to beguile the emperor’s man in London while
the king and Cromwell were scavenging for ways to proceed against the
emperor’s Aunt Catherine, the Aragonese bishops, and Hapsburg
preferences? G.W. Bernard thinks that More’s conduct in Parliament is
telling and that “whatever impressions Chapuys may have formed,” the
chancellor’s public addresses tell against his “passionate advoc[acy] of
Queen Catherine’s cause.” 10 Chapuys wrote repeatedly that
developments during More’s tenure in office stirred the queen’s
“adherents . . . [to] come more prominently forward.” But when More
came forward in the Commons to read the universities’ endorsements
of his king’s suit or to protest that the complaint against Catherine (and
Pope Julius II, who had sanctioned Henry’s first marriage) originated in
the king’s conscientious pursuit of what was right and religious (and not
in royal lust), the chancellor could certainly not be numbered among
Chapuy’s prominent “adherents.” 11 More later denied that Parliament
had a right to pronounce on the illegitimacy of Henry’s first marriage,
and that sentiment might tempt one to imagine that Chapuys’ earlier
9

Guy, More, p. 152.
Bernard, Reformation, p. 134-35.
11
CSP, Spain, 4.1, p. 433.
10
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dispatches were accurate. If they were--if what More said after he
resigned, and especially after government harassment wrecked his
hopes for an uneventful retirement--one could make a more convincing
argument for the Elton’s and Guy’s explanations for More’s agreement
to become chancellor. Remarks that were made in 1533 and 1534,
however, are not the best evidence for More’s thinking in 1529, for why
he became chancellor.
One answer to that “why,” which is somewhat related to the view
that stresses the chancellor’s Aragonese partisanship, could also explain
why he catered to the Hapsburgs’ interests. Chapuys could have been
astute with respect to More’s prudence, missing only his purpose.
Indeed, the chancellor--without being particularly attentive to royal
weddings, neither Henry’s first and much-discussed nor his second,
much-desired--could have been looking to befriend the pope’s friends
in England. He may have agreed to become chancellor to defend “the
prymatie of the pope.” He did, after all, help Henry answer Martin
Luther and vindicate papal authority in 1521, yet he later insisted that
the king--not he--was deliriously eager to confirm Rome’s rule of the
church. More even volunteered that Henry’s enthusiasms for the
papacy swayed him. 12 That was a convenient fiction in the 1530s, after
Henry’s officials started hounding the former chancellor for failing to
repudiate Rome. But the truth seems to be that the king did play an
important part in More’s increasing fondness for the pope’s “prymatie,”
just not the part More assigned him. When Henry was drawn into the
orbit around the early English reformers, who, “follow[ing] theyr owne
wyttes,” threatened to turn Christianity in the realm into a pack of rival
and snarling sects, More realized how critical the papacy had been and
still was for the preservation of liturgical uniformity and religious unity.
From that time--not before--his catalogues of Luther’s heretical
opinions featured “unstinting devotion to papal sovereignty” similar to
dedication expressed by Bishop John Fisher. 13
12

The Correspondence of Sir Thomas More, ed., Elizabeth Frances Rogers,
Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 298.
13
Marius, “Henry VIII, Thomas More, and the Bishop of Rome”, in Quincentennial
Essays on St. Thomas More, ed., Michael J. Moore Boone, North Carolina: Albion,
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In late 1529, what terribly disturbed More was the church’s
vulnerability to Luther’s assaults on holy orders, religious vows,
purgatory, saints, sacraments--rei Christiani. In what remains, I leave the
reservoir of explanations that we have emptied here to argue that
Thomas More became chancellor, not because he thought the queen,
the Aragonese faction, the pope, or the king could resolve the coming
crisis and chaos, but because he believed that they could not. And the
bishops who could, he suspected, would need him in office to give
them that chance.
* * *
More’s Dialogue Concerning Heresies, composed shortly before he
became chancellor, is, among other things, a vindication of “the grete
lordes spyrytuall.” The purpose was to suggest that reformers were far
from fully aware of the consequences, should their criticisms of the
church’s top brass lead to radical changes. Occasionally, More paused
to take up specific charges. At one point, he tried to cool still
simmering resentments that had been brought to a boil nearly twenty
years before, when William Horsey, the bishop of London’s chief
administrative officer, was pardoned for having murdered layman
Richard Hunne, a prisoner in the Tower at the time. Church officials
insisted that Hunne had taken his own life. His detention was
controversial. In More’s retelling of the sorrowful tale, the casualty was
the antagonist. Rightly condemned for heresy and “in fere of worldly
shame,” a despondent Hunne committed suicide. More was present
when some testimony was taken and subsequently studied the
proceedings “from toppe to too.” He recalled that proscribed books
found in the heretic’s possession contained annotations in his hand,
which proved that Horsey and Bishop FitzJames had not planted
evidence. And “fewe [could] forbere laughynge,” More wrote, when a
1978, p. 94-95, p. 102-6; Kaufman, Incorrectly Political, University of Notre Dame
Press, 2007, p. 192-93; CW 5.1, p. 526-27.
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self-proclaimed expert witness defended his theory that Hunne “dyd
never hange hym selfe” but was put in the noose after having been
strangled. The forensic expert’s “tokens” to that effect were
“preposterous” rather than “playne,” as he had claimed. The verdict,
then, More’s and the establishment’s: Hunne “was not honest”; Horsey
was fairly treated; the bishop of London was “virtuouse” and “wise.” 14
Many commoners doubted all of the above from the time the news
broke and decades thereafter. Uncertainties persist to this day, when
Hunne’s initial complaints against clerical greed and injustice are taken
as characteristic of anticlerical sentiment during the late fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries. But during the 1520s and 1530s, Hunne’s fate
appeared to show what lengths the church would go to protect its
privileges. More’s rehearsal of the episode was very much against the
grain: “nearly all the people here hate the priests,” Chapuys confided. 15
A few years after Chapuys gauged lay dissatisfaction, Christopher St.
German observed that “murmur and grudge” characterized most
commoners’ comments on their church, especially their assessments of
its leadership, which, he claimed, wanted “pitie.” More accused St.
German of making “spiritual men odious,” solely on the grounds of
hearsay, although the latter declared that he was only urging priests and
highly placed prelates “a litel [to] meken them selfe” and regain the
laity’s respect. 16 Henry earlier expressed regret that “murmur and
grudge” gave the evangelical reformers an opening. More was still
chancellor when the king advised Emperor Charles V, through
Chapuys, to convene a council and--without awaiting Rome’s
endorsement--to address Luther’s objections to late medieval Catholic
practice. Henry had reason to wean Charles from Rome; together,
emperor and pope posed the most substantial obstacle to his plans for
Catherine and Anne Boleyn. Yet the king was especially and
unexpectedly aggressive, introducing his own resolve to strip the clergy
of its temporalities without permission from the papacy or from a
14

CW 6,1, p. 318-30.
CSP, Spain, 4.1, p. 367-69.
16
St. German, Salem and Bizance, reprinted in CW 10, p. 350-51.
15
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conference of his bishops, to rehabilitate his realm’s church and to
defuse--by anticipation and correction--the reformers’ protests. 17
More was keenly aware of the mood in the country before Henry
had contemplated seizing the temporalities of “the grete lordes
spyrytuall” and before Christopher St. German warned them of
“murmur and grudge.” The interlocutor in More’s Dialogue drew the
relevant lesson from scripture: Jesus directed his apostles--hence, “all
bysshops . . . and prelates and rulers of his church”--not “to bynde and
lay upon . . . pore men’s backs importunable burdeyns, to the berynge
wherof them selfe [they] wyll not ones [once] put forth a finger.” That
lesson or directive has the cadence of a complaint, which More
endorsed (“very well sayd”), yet the Dialogue refuses to let the
interlocutor’s exegesis pass as an excuse for disobedience. Church
leaders’ failures to unburden the poor were deplorable, yet More denied
that lay insolence was a proper reply to prelates who proved to be short
on compassion. Moses urged “the peple do what theyr prelatys wolde
byd them, though the burden were hevy, and let them not to do it,
though they sholde se the bydders do clene the contrary.” 18
There would always be bad apples among the clerical “bydders.”
Early English evangelical reformers were adept at trading on the
scandals that came to light, but, More averred, standards that priests
and prelates had set for the laity did not expire the moment their own
behavior turned ugly or their misbehavior was discovered and
publicized. And, equally to the point, despite the promise in the Gospel
of Matthew, that every Christian’s “yoke” would be light or agreeable
(11:30: suave; leve), the faithful must not expect that their priests and
bishops--however strong their backs--would lift all the burdens on
Christian commoners. Still, More’s concession that clerical backs were
sometimes as weak as the church’s critics claimed did not release the
laity from its obligations. Within the Dialogue’s discussion of “burdens,”
he strategically tucked in a Catholic, categorical imperative, “obedyance
to our superyours,” which he claimed to have lifted from its crib in
17
18

CSP, Spain, 4.1, p. 798-801.
CW 6.1, p. 103-4.
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scripture. Its placement guaranteed that readers would draw two
conclusions. First, the gospels’ good news did not lower standards for
discipline. Yes, their “yoke” was “light,” yet “the lyghtnes of [the]
burdeyne standeth not in the slacknes of any bodyly payne . . . but
standeth in the swetnes of hope wherby we fele in our payne a plesaunt
taste of heven.” Second, prelates’ missteps did not render offenders
helpless in the realm’s battles against heresy. Bishops especially--though
they “do clene the contrary” to what they bid others to do and give the
church’s contentious enemies ammunition--should be obeyed, because
they know those enemies’ wiles and whereabouts. 19 If anticlericalism
were permitted to erode alliances between “oure superyours” in church
and government, More intimated, the only beneficiaries would be
heretics eager “for the abolycyon of the fayth and spoylyng of the
spyrytualtye,” heretics who were also political subversives bent on “the
destruccyon of the kyng and all his nobylyte.” Soon after More agreed
to become Lord Chancellor, he composed some late medieval
boilerplate, which, in this context, can pass also as a succinct answer to
this essay’s question, his unequivocal description of the duty of “great
officers of the realme” to “represse heretykes and assyst the
ordynaryes.”20
Did he appreciate how formidable the challenge was in autumn,
1529? What did he make of the predictions that England would
“decline from the pope,” if the king’s case against Catherine were sent
to Rome? We began with those predictions (and warnings) of
widespread disaffection because Wolsey and his retainers introduced
them to preserve his legatine jurisdiction and usefulness. Those tactics
failed, and Wolsey fell. His successor as chancellor, More, might have
dismissed what was uttered about the realm’s “decline” and disaffection
as rhetorical excess, as an awkwardly unsuccessful effort to intimidate.
But John Guy thinks otherwise, that More clearly perceived the crisis.
Would the new chancellor have missed the importance of Praemunire
charges against Wolsey? Could there have been any more dramatic way
for Henry to signal irritation with Wolsey for having maintained his
19
20

CW 6.1, p. 106.
CW 8.1, p. 27-28; CW 9, p. 161-62.
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legatine jurisdiction as long as he did and, in effect, for having appealed
to extraterritorial--or, specifically, papal--arbitration in royal affairs?
Probably not. And surely More must have learned how grave a crisis he
faced when, months later, eight English bishops were charged with
aiding and abetting Wolsey, with “Praemunire by association,” as
Andrew Chibi aptly phrases it. Guy’s surmise, then, seems sound; More
was smart enough to see the difficulties ahead. Historians now know
enough to agree with Guy that the advocation of Henry’s case to the
papal curia doomed More’s efforts to leash anticlericalism and “assyst
the ordynaryes.” Still, the prognosis, which would have affected More’s
motives for taking his new job, could have been different. Perhaps if
we revisit the situation--and More’s perceptions of it--in late 1529, we
may find that Guy’s “surprise” that More should have “ever believed he
might succeed” is itself surprising. 21
For one thing, right before he assumed office, More expressed
confidence in the bishops’ courts as well as in the bishops. His Dialogue
praised clerical magistrates and their deputies for having “wysely
examined” accused and accusers to ascertain whether the latter’s malice
or the former’s malfeasance was at issue. To the new chancellor, the
church had reliable techniques to probe for truth, men with prowess to
search for spite that complicated the administration of justice, and ways
to right wrongs and to reform abuses.22
Critics who resented the jurisdiction of the church’s courts as well as
critics who were angry with the church itself continued to insist that
clerical justice was notoriously unreliable.
For, “uppon light
complayntes,” innocents, they said, had been subjected to terrible
ordeals. More may have thought that he had incisively and decisively
answered charges of that sort in the Dialogue when he examined what
happened during and after the prosecution of Richard Hunne, yet he
unquestionably could see that the enemies of the established church
were relentless. Hence, reassuringly and almost nonstop, More tried to
21

Guy, Public Career, p. 110-12; Andrew Allan Chibi, Henry VIII’s Bishops:
Diplomats, Administrators, Scholars, and Shepherds Cambridge: Clarke, 2003, p.
123.
22
CW 6.1, p. 261.
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address and attenuate their prejudice, even after he resigned from
government, asserting that matters “given into the ordynary’s handes”
would be handled fairly and expeditiously. 23 Possibly before St. German
joined the critics and pressed Parliament severely to restrict the
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts--all the while protesting that he
had no wish to “break . . . the libertie of the church”– More had
ascertained just how compromised the church’s tribunals had become.
Nonetheless, St. German’s proposals for reform only later grabbed his
attention. Until then, nothing of that kind seems to have been
advanced coherently and with clout. Furthermore, temperamentally,
More was inclined to credit any word to the contrary, to value--as more
than flattery--the concessions composed by accused heretic Thomas
Bilney who remarked favorably on the integrity and wisdom of Bishop
Cuthbert Tunstall, who was just then preparing to preside over Bilney’s
trial. 24
Tunstall registered the compliment but did not relax his demand
that Bilney “abjure and submitte.” 25 More admired the bishop and
agreed, at his request, to review heretical books and, as Tunstall’s souschef, to cook up a comprehensive response. The Dialogue Concerning
Heresies was the result and is an invaluable monument to More’s
readiness to “assyst the ordynaryes.” Tunstall was in London soon after
its publication to see More made chancellor. Had he not been
translated to the diocese of Durham months later, Tunstall would
doubtlessly have renewed efforts undertaken with Bishop Longland of
Lincoln to suppress the presses, booksellers, and preachers spreading
the evangelicals’ ideas, particularly in areas around London and Oxford-efforts that would certainly have been underwritten by the new
chancellor. For More had already pronounced those ideas subversive.
“Where be . . . your bysshoppys,” he asked dissidents, struck by how
much faith they had placed in their faith. Their fideism falsely attributed
23
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the power to redeem sinners to those very sinners’ trusting dispositions.
And what was just as ludicrous and dangerous--their faith made them
indifferent to authorities’ censures and to religious authority itself. 26
Tunstall was an ally. The two were together in Calais on a
diplomatic mission during the summer of 1529, well away from the
legatine proceedings that so frustrated Wolsey and their king. More
was likely saddened by Tunstall’s departure for Durham, where he was
to preside over the king’s council as well a new diocese. His translation
made room for John Stokesley, who spent the first months of 1530
canvassing French and Italian universities, soliciting endorsements of
King Henry’s position on the relative power of papal dispensations and
biblical prohibitions. On that issue, for a while longer, Tunstall
remained among Catherine’s advocates. Stokesley was in the king’s
corner, yet More could not have been displeased with his new bishop’s
efforts in London and Essex, hounding heretics and improving the
quality of unbeneficed clergy who served as curates. Stokesley was
following instructions. Several sessions of the Convocation of clergy
that met the month before More became chancellor instructed bishops
to silence priests who, pernicioso errore, embraced and circulated heretical
opinions. But Convocation also told bishops to answer heretics’
complaints by reforming abuses. Notwithstanding John Guy’s
“surprise,” therefore, one can appreciate why More had reason to
believe that he and the ordinaries might succeed staving off radical
religious change. 27
The would-be evangelical change agents, after all, seemed to be full
of faith and brimming with criticism, but with no plan. They
mistrusted “people that be knowen for the chyrche,” particularly the
prelates, who, at their best, were adept at keeping religious consensus
from unraveling. Who or what in the dissident fideists’ camp could
serve that purpose? Where, indeed, were their bishops? More thought
that he knew why reformers had enormous difficulty addressing such
questions; specifically, he suspected that their ostensibly interminable
26
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complaints about authority expressed an unalterable conviction that any
concentration of power in the churches would be unbiblical. More
pegged the dissidents as dreamers; their perfect church, “bylde up in
the ayre all so spyrytuall,” floated free of reality. 28
Disregarding Luther’s insistence that all Christians were sinners by
nature--saved only by grace and faith--the early English evangelicals,
More assumed, were determined to “fynde or ymagyn in erth” a sinless
church--sinless, popeless, and bishopless. More’s response in the
Dialogue was simple and straightforward: power might corrupt some of
their number, but officials most conspicuously “knowen for the
chyrche,” the realm’s bishops, were instrumental in maintaining
religious discipline, minimizing the damage sin prompted, and
continually mending the ministry. 29 Yet More grew disillusioned with
some of the bishops he had hoped to help. They caved under pressure
from Cromwell and the king. After he resigned as chancellor, More
lamented that “the best lerned” among his associates, having once
“saide and plaine affirmed the contrarye . . . often and after great
diligens done to seke and finde out the trouth,” acquiesced in the
government usurpation of papal prerogatives. Whether he had names
or just numbers in mind--and whether the names were those of
bishops, there can be no doubt that More lost his faith in arbitrio
ordinariorum, in the bishops’ discretion. 30
But only gradually and grudgingly! And the matter of pace bears
directly on the question of the new chancellor’s expectations in late
1529, which, of course, bear on this paper’s argument with previous,
competing explanations for More’s decision at the time. In 1529, the
church, for More, was God’s way to “put out all perplexyte.” Early
English evangelical reformers, reading their bibles, went hopelessly
astray because they were loath to consult church authorities,
disconcertingly claiming that the church had been “orphaned.” They
appeared to forget, conveniently, those parts of the scripture in which
God promised to guide the church and delegated powers to its officials.
28
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Or so it seemed to More. 31 Bishops spotted the problem with
heretically selective and therefore flawed exegesis. Many also worried
that their king’s flirtation with the dissidents jeopardized their own
abilities to censure critics, remedy abuses, and rule the church. Bishops
Fisher (Rochester), Clerk (Bath and Wells), and West (Ely) appealed to
Rome against what was, to them, the government’s campaign against
the church’s independence. Bishop Tunstall finally conceded that his
king might exercise a measure of supremacy over the church, yet only
after he stipulated that dissidents remain subject to the bishops’
discipline. Ambassadors reported, though, that outspoken prelates had
put themselves in peril. 32
Still, in 1529 and for a time thereafter, More had reason to think
that, with some assistance rather than resistance from the government,
the realm’s church would reform itself. Thomas Wolsey left behind “a
solid working synod, fighting heresy,” according to historian Andrew
Chibi, “a powerful spiritual fraternity,” members of which significantly
disagreed with each other when they pondered the way out of the
king’s marital mess, but agreed on the need to stop the spread of
heretical ideas. 33 And they all agreed with More that, if the government
were seen to be encouraging the evangelicals, commoners would do so
as well; the laity, for instance, would take dissidents at their word,
presuming that they believed what they read in the Bible, when--More
charged--they only read into the Bible what they already believed. As
More explained to his old friend Erasmus in 1532, struggles against
English evangelicals--sectarians, he called them--required constant and
tremendous effort (sedulo semper hactenus), and, to that point, the church
had been only partly successful. Henry had backed off instead of
intervening when the bishops pursued reformer Hugh Latimer that
year, but neither they nor the chancellor put a serious dent in
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dismissively obstinate heretics’ hopes to win king and kingdom for the
reformed faith. 34
More kept Erasmus informed, perhaps because his old friend on the
Continent, who left England for the last time nearly twenty years
before, shared responsibility for More’s having agreed to serve as
chancellor. Brendan Bradshaw’s replies to Elton and Guy raise that
possibility. Commenting on More’s alleged Aragonese partisanship and
on his purportedly cruel and near obsessive hunt for heretics--that he
was committed to “reactionary ultra conservatism”--Bradshaw
maintains that More measured his steps to implement a moderate
“Erasmian humanist” reform program. Bradshaw’s More looked for
opportunities to promote a reform of the realm’s religion and society
that originated with “human self-development by rational means” and
depended on the “symbiotic relationship” between grace and “rational
moral endeavor directed towards human perfection.” Compatibly,
Brian Gogan marks More’s “democratic predilections” and underscores
the premium he placed on consensus as a source of religious truth.
Both Bradshaw and Gogan wager that More, following Erasmus, had a
substantially greater interest in what the two thought commoners’
“moral freedom” could do rather than in what they reckoned prelates’
tribunals, visitations, and dispensations could achieve. 35 Enough can be
teased from More’s Dialogue to give that reading of More’s humanist
reform program a prima facie plausibility. Take the treatise’s warning
against “wading in scripture” without “good gydes,” a passage that one
would expect to include justifications for episcopal leadership. It does
not. It begins on a typically “Erasmian” note and finishes trumpeting
the “consensus of the faithful.” “There is no man so lowe,” More
avers, “but yf he wyll seke his way with the staffe of hys fayth in his
hande . . . and serche a way therwith and have the olde holy fathers also
34

H.M. Allen and H.W. Garrod, Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, vol.
10, Oxford: Clarendon, 1958, p. 33-34.
35
Bradshaw, “The Controversial Thomas More,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History
36, 1985, p. 560-67, and Gogan, The Common Corps of Christendom:
Ecclesiological Themes in the Writings of Sir Thomas More, Leiden: Brill, 1982, p.
322-28, p. 366-70.

Moreana Vol. 45, 174 (Oct. 2008) 189

for hys gydes . . . usynge reason and refusynge no good lernynge,” he
will reach satisfactory conclusions sans faute. 36
But there is more. For the Dialogue adds immediately that it would
be a mistake for anyone “to trust upon [his or her] owne wytte.”
Sectarian dissidents did exactly that, and the wheels came off every
doctrinal consensus they fashioned. “No man so lowe,” though, is able
to avoid the dissidents’ freelancing, fractious discourses by clinging to
what More identified as “the common fayth of the catholyke church,”
the consensus that materialized over time and–judging from what his
instructions on “wading in scripture” did not say-–the consensus that
descend upon the church and not one that depended on its executives’
finesse. 37
Judging from what Thomas More did not say here or there,
however, is risky. True, he “did not dwell on the episcopal office as
such”; not his style. 38 Yet evidence harvested from the Dialogue
confirms that More trusted church leadership in the early sixteenth
century--as well as a return to the counsel of “the olde holy fathers”--to
save Christianity in England from the dreaded disintegration that had
followed evangelicals’ attempts to spread their truths on the Continent.
“Where be . . . your bysshops,” More asked, taunting the reformers
with their infamous inability to get along with each other; faith was fine
yet potentially divisive. “The common fayth of the catholyke chyrche
was better--and binding. It bound believers to the “knowen catholyke
churche,” More never tired of asserting, a church that was “knowen”
and visible, as was Christ. Jesus was both “by fayth byleved and yet also
by syght and felyng knowen.” 39 Tudor bishops made the church
“knowen, endeavored to make it moral, and hounded heretics to keep it
whole. And those bishops were the heirs to the “olde fathers” and
“gydes.” More’s Dialogue does not “dwell on the episcopal office,” yet,
written just before he agreed to become chancellor, it respects the
realm’s bishops as custodians of truths taught by the apostles, the
36
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church’s first executives, and handed down “in our dayes by contynuall
succession from theyrs.” 40
***
But highly placed prelates were increasingly unpopular in Parliament
and at Court. More’s very appointment as chancellor signaled the king’s
growing irritation to chronicler Edward Hall, who was sure that Henry
was determined that “no manne of the spiritualtie” would take Wolsey’s
place. 41 Did More miss the signal? And how unlikely did it seem to
him that, as chancellor, he might pull the church’s reputation back up
by its bishops, “assyst the ordynaryes,” appease some dissidents, and
chase off the implacably heretical others? John Guy, as noted, was
“surprised” that More could ever have thought it all possible in late
1529. I have argued that More’s surprise during his tenure in office was
different. For, despite growing anticlericalism, popular sentiment had
not caught up with Cromwell. More’s surprise, therefore, could well
have resembled that of historian Richard Rex, who claims that a “truly
astonishing feature of the Henrician revolution is that a manifestly
unpopular and unwanted policy was imposed so successfully and with
so little public disturbance.” 42
Thomas Cromwell could be considered the impresario of the Tudor
clergy’s unpopularity. His influence on the king grew steadily while
More served as chancellor. Information about Cromwell’s maneuvers
appears to have been shared with More only rarely, on a need-to-know
basis. Twentieth-century historians, however, trawled through drafts of
petitions, memoranda, and legislation to put Cromwell in his proper
and pivotal place in the king’s administration. He could kindle criticism
of the church but also douse it when calm served his purposes. When,
during routine reconnaissance, he spotted some phrases that seemed
too insulting, too soon (“ravenous wolves”), Cromwell deleted them
from the inventories of grievances against church officials. During the
40
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winter sessions of 1529--just after More was made chancellor-Cromwell’s sieve caught complaints, which he “shrewdly filed away”
for future use, Stanford Lehmberg now says, Cromwell’s own intense
antipathy remaining obscure. More could be excused, then, for
thinking that lay complaints about clerical absenteeism and excessive
fees, which Cromwell pulled from the more comprehensive grievances
registered in 1529, could be easily answered with adjustments that
should only have improved, and not impaired, a bishop’s ability to fight
off heresy. The new chancellor had the luxury of believing that “the
perpetuall chyrche” in the realm might be upgraded and would remain
perpetually and usefully episcopal. 43
By 1533, More had resigned. In May, according to Hall, Henry
contemplated aloud before delegates from both houses of Parliament
the culmination of the course Cromwell was apparently charting for
some time. “We thought that the clergie of our realme had been our
subjectes wholy,” Henry said, “but now wee have well perceived that
they bee but halfe our subjectes, yea, scace our subjectes.” And,
conceivably, what followed fused the king’s exhilaration with irritation,
for he took direct aim at England’s bishops who were to become truly
his bishops. Until then, though, at their consecrations, they made “an
othe to the pope, clene contrary to the othe that they make to us.” So,
until then, they had been “his subjectes and not ours.” 44 For their part,
nearly all the bishops capitulated. Dissent dropped to a whisper. More,
disappointed, fell silent; only when it became clear that he would die for
his dissent, did he appeal from the king, his courts, and his bishops to
the pope. As for More’s last analysis, we cannot be sure whether he
mostly blamed the bishops for possessing too little courage or stamina
or the courtiers around Henry for reducing the church to a cipher. He
became chancellor to “assyst the ordynaryes” to live up to their
obligations. But they were forced to live down to their critics’
assessments and expectations, the critics who had been heard--by
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More--to propose that the bishops “be and ever have been and shalbe
very false and nought.” 45
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